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The Landowner's Right of Access to the Abutting Street
A Damaging for the Public Use
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to the start of the twentieth century, the wording of most
state constitutions provided for the recovery of compensation for
an injury to one's property by a governmental instrumentality only
where the injury constituted a "taking."' Unless there was an actual
physical taking of the property, a landowner was not entitled to
compensation for a damaging to his property by public works, as
this was considered to be damnum absque injuria.' To alleviate the
injustice created by this proposition, the majority of the states
amended their constitutions to provide for the payment of compen-
sation for a damaging as well as a taking of private property s In
1876 article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution was amended to
read as follows: "No person's property shall be taken, damaged, or
destroyed for or applied to public use, without adequate compensa-
tion being made, unless by consent of such person. . . ." Today, the
law is well settled that a direct physical invasion of property is not
necessary to entitle an owner to compensation! Under the modern
and prevailing view, any substantial interference with the rights
accompanying the ownership of private property can result in a
"taking" or "damaging" in the constitutional sense." It can be said as
a general rule that a complete destruction of the use and value of
property constitutes a taking.' To establish "damages" as contem-
plated by article I, section 17, the courts have held that the land-
owner must show that his property incurred special damages not
'The applicable constitutional provision in Texas before 1876 read as follows: "No
person's property shall be taken or applied to public use without just compensation being
made, unless by consent of such person." TEx. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1869). See generally
2 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 365-76, 390-98, 486-87 (3d ed. 1964).
'State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941).
' Stubbs, Access Rights of an Abutting Landowner, 1963 PROCEEDINGS OF S.W. LEGAL
FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 59, 61.
" TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. Compare the former provision, cited supra note 1.
'McGammon & Lang Lumber Co. v. Trinity & B.V. Ry., 104 Tex. 8, 133 S.W. 247
(1911); Gainesville, H. & W. R.R. v. Hall, 78 Tex. 169, 14 S.W. 259 (1890). "To en-
title the party to compensation under our present constitution, it is not necessary that the
property shall be destroyed, nor is it necessary that it shall be even taken. It is sufficient to
entitle him to compensation that his property has been damaged. The fact of being dam-
aged entitles him to the protection extended by this constitutional provision, as fully as if his
property had been actually taken or destroyed." Gulf, C. & S. F. R.R. v. Eddins, 60 Tex.
656, 663 (1884). For a thorough discussion of these cases and others, see RAYBURN, TEXAS
LAW OF CONDEMNATION, 593-614 (1960).
' See 2 NICHOLS, OP. cit. supra note 1, at 407-09.
"Fort Worth Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of Fort Worth, 106 Tex. 148, 158 S.W.
164, 168 (1913).
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suffered by the community at large; i.e., the damages must be differ-
ent in kind, not merely in degree, from that suffered by the general
public.8
In applying these damage principles, a distinction has sometimes
been drawn between an exercise of the police power and an exercise
of the power of eminent domain. The latter is defined as the power
of the sovereign to take property for the public use without the
owner's consent. The police power involves the regulation of prop-
erty rights where their free exercise is considered detrimental to the
public interest.' Generally, the most important distinction between
these two powers is that a damaging of property resulting from an
exercise of the power of eminent domain requires a payment of ade-
quate compensation; while a valid exercise of the police power which
results in a damaging requires no compensation. 1 In the case of
Lombardo v. City of Dallas," involving a zoning regulation, the Su-
preme Court of Texas stated the rule that "police regulations do not
constitute a taking of property under the right of eminent domain;
and compensation is not required to be made for such loss as is occa-
sioned by the proper exercise of the police power."" An injury to
private property caused by a police regulation is damnum absque
injuria; it is compensated for by the sharing in the general benefits
which the regulation is intended to secure. " Of course, the police
power cannot be exercised arbitrarily but (1) the purpose must be
justified through public necessity," and (2) the means used must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.' How-
ever, it should be noted that some so-called exercises of the police
power have been held to require the payment of compensation. The
court in Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham" stated:
But when the private property is 'taken, damaged or destroyed to a
public use,' not because it has been used to the public detriment, but
because the new use will be beneficial to the public, compensation must
be made. We have seen no authority which holds that when power is
exerted to consummate an enterprise in the public interest which re-
quires the taking or damaging of private property, there may be no
8 1d. at 169. See generally I NICHOLS, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 87.
9 See I NICHOLS, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 87.
0Kucera, Eminent Domain v. Police Power-A Common Misconception, 1959 PRo-
CEEDINGS OF S. W. LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 1.
11 Id. at 7.
2124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934).
"3 Id. at 478.
"Barbier .v Connelly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884); Ellis v. City of West Univ. Place, 141
Tex. 608, 175 S.W.2d 396 (1943).
" Spann v .City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (1921).
S'Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
"'335 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), aff'd, 354 S.W.2d 99 (1962).
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compensation. Whether the power so exercised is called the police power
or the power of eminent domain, it nevertheless results in a taking or
damaging in the purview of the constitutional provision."8
Thus, even if a governmental instrumentality claims that it has
exercised its police power for the protection of society, the courts
will not categorically deny the payment of damages when it is clear
that the property was damaged for the public use. The results in
Brazos River do not seem unusual in view of the fact that the dam-
aging was caused by the construction of a dam for the public use-
an obvious exercise of the power of eminent domain.
II. THE ABUTTING LANDOWNER'S RIGHT OF ACCESS
An abutting landowner has an easement of access to the street or
highway immediately appurtenant to his property, and this ease-
ment is not shared with the public at large but arises out of and is
peculiar to the ownership of the fee."9 Although the origin of this
proposition is uncertain, it appears to be a product of the rapid urban
development in America and stems from the leading case of Story
v. New York Elevated R.R.," decided in 1882. The doctrine of abut-
ter's rights has been extended until today it is generally accepted
that not only the easement of access, but also the easements of light,
air, and view from the street attach to the ownership of adjoining
lands.21 The "right of access" as used in this context means that a
property owner possesses an easement of access to the abutting street
at any or all points included within his frontage on the street." This
right, which is recognized as being "property" in the constitutional
sense, is subordinate to the paramount interest of the public in the
use of the highway. 3 However, the overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions, including Texas, hold that the right of access cannot be
taken or destroyed for the public use without the payment of ade-
quate compensation.' The courts are equally agreed upon the prop-
" 335 S.W.2d at 251. (Emphasis added.)
t9 Talltimbers Corp. v. Anderson, 370 S.W.2d 214, 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), aff'd,
378 S.W.2d 16 (1964); Kalteyer v. Sullivan, 46 S.W. 288, 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898)
error ref.
2o90 N.Y. 112 (1882). For a complete analysis and history of the doctrine of abutter's
rights, see NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 35 (1963).
'"American Constr. Co. v. Seelig, 104 Tex. 16, 133 S.W. 429 (1911). See also 3
NICHOLS, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 369.
"'In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 93 Ohio 179, 112 N.E.2d
411, 415 (1952).
23Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467, 469 (1885).
1
4 Adams v. Grapotte, 69 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), aff'd, 130 Tex. 587,
111 SW..2d 690 (1938); City of Texarkana v. Lawson, 168 S.W. 867 (Tex. Civ. App.




osition that the right of access is subject to police regulation for the
health, safety, and general welfare of the public; and the authorities
agree that the property owner is not entitled to compensation for an
interference with this right by a reasonable exercise of the police
power." However, the courts have held that a legitimate exercise of
the police power cannot interfere with one's right of access to the
extent that it constitutes a complete taking, as distinguished from a
damaging." A complete taking based on an exercise of the police
power will require the payment of compensation. This rule was
applied somewhat by the Texas Supreme Court in the recent case of
San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking." The court held that where an
owner's land abutts on two streets, the city under its police power can
deny all access to one of the streets by an ordinance which is in-
tended to alleviate the traffic hazard created when a driveway is con-
structed across a public sidewalk. The decision rests on the rationale
that there is no taking of an owner's right of access under the police
power when he is left with reasonable access to his property by way
of another street and that any resulting loss or inconvenience is
damnum absque injuria. Thus, one's right of access to a particular
street can be completely taken by an exercise of the police power
without the payment of compensation so long as some means of
reasonable access to the property is left.
The greatest difficulty arises when the right of access is damaged
through an exercise of the power of eminent domain. The Texas
Supreme Court in Powell v. Houston & T.C. Ry.2 s stated that any
impairment or depreciation in the value of one's right of access con-
stitutes damages within the meaning of article I, section 17 of the
Texas Constitution. To be compensable, the injury must be shown
to be special in kind and not one shared in common with the public
as a whole."' It should be noted, however, that with the advent of
modern freeways and controlled access highways, several doctrines
have evolved which limit and restrict the recovery of damages for
an injury to one's right of access."s The first doctrine involves the
"diversion of traffic" by the construction of a new highway or street
which usually parallels the old roadway. As stated by the court in
25 See note 15 supra and accompanying text. For a general discussion of this topic, see
Comment, Eminent Domain v. Police Power as Related to the Abutting Owner's Right of
Access, 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 70 (1962).20Gulf Ref. Co. v. Ft. Worth, 36 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Gulf Ref. Co.
v. Dallas, 10 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.
2'158 Tex. 318, 311 S.W.2d 218 (1958); see Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 522 (1958).
2' 104 Tex. 219, 135 S.W. 1153 (1911).
2"See note 9 supra.
3°See Gibbs, Control of Highway Access-Its Prospects and Problems, 12 S.C.L.Q. 377
(1960).
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Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State,3 "no abutting property owner has a
vested interest in the traffic that passes in front of his property, and
if this traffic is diverted by the State building a road at another
place, and the traveling public prefer to travel the new road and
abandon the old road, the State cannot be held liable for any loss of
trade suffered by an abutting landowner in the old abandoned road."
In other words, there is no liability if, by the construction of the new
roadway, the state does not impair or destroy the abutting land-
owner's access rights to the old roadway. The "circuity of travel"
doctrine involves changes in the design or structure of the highways
whereby the abutter retains his access to the public highway but is
compelled to use a more circuitous route to go to and from his prop-
erty. This situation often arises when the changes in the highway
involve the making of one-way streets, prohibition of U-turns, di-
vided highways, and control of entrance and exits to such highways."
The majority of jurisdictions view "circuity of travel" as noncom-
pensable damage on the basis that it is not special in nature but is
shared in varying degree by the public in general." As long as the
abutter is left with reasonable access, his special interest in access
to the highway is satisfied. An opposing view, often criticized,' holds
that the abutter's interest does not involve merely the opportunity
to go onto the street in front of his property but rather involves the
right of direct access from his property to the abutting street." The
third doctrine involves the situation where a street which once inter-
sected with a highway is blocked so that it terminates at the free-
way. The resulting dead-end street is known as a "cul-de-sac," and
the doctrine is accorded the same name. The courts have split on
the question of whether the owner of property abutting on a street
turned into a cul-de-sac is entitled to compensation. In the California
case of Bacich v. Board of Control," the abutter was allowed to
recover damages on the basis that the right of access extends in both
directions to the next intersecting street. This view appears to con-
flict with the circuity of travel doctrine which implies that where
the abutter on a cul-de-sac still has reasonable access to the general
system of streets from the other direction, any damage resulting
"' 334 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref.
" See Gibbs, suPra note 30, at 393.
"Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958);
Cavanaugh v. Gerk, 313 Mo. 375, 280 S.W. 51 (1926); Lindley v. Oklahoma Turnpike
Authority, 262 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1953).
'4See Comment, Freeways and the Rights of Abutting Owners, 3 STAN. L. REv. 298,
307 (1951; Comment, Eminent Domain-Damages-Recovery for Interference With the
Right of Access, 18 So. CAL. L. REv. 42 (1944).
'People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944).
'423 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
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from his inconvenience is noncompensable. Most jurisdictions have
accepted the general rule 7 that an abutter on a dead-end street suf-
fers no special damage as long as he is left with reasonable access to
the general system of streets in one direction.
III. DuPuv v. CITY OF WACO3
In 1962 the city of Waco elevated South Seventeenth Street by
the construction of a viaduct to improve the flow of traffic. DuPuy's
property had fronted on this street, but after construction of the
viaduct it was left fourteen feet below South Seventeenth. A con-
crete pillar formed a solid barrier to the immediate right of his
building so that the only means of access to DuPuy's property was
by a way under the viaduct between the supporting columns and
dead-ending at his property or via an alley running from the side
of his building to Franklin Avenue. In other words, the property was
left abutting on a cul-de-sac under the viaduct. DuPuy recovered
damages in the trial court under article I, section 17 of the Texas
Constitution for the impairment of his right of access. The court of
civil appeals" reversed on the ground that the construction of the
viaduct was a reasonable exercise of the police power and any dam-
age to DuPuy was damnum absque injuria.4° In reversing the court
of civil appeals, the Texas Supreme Court held (1) that the city of
Waco had constructed the viaduct for the public use rather than for
the purpose of regulating the use of DuPuy's property in the public
interest; and (2) that DuPuy had suffered compensable damages
within the meaning of article I, section 17; the road ending in the
cul-de-sac was held an unreasonable means of access.
The city of Waco and the attorneys for several other municipali-
ties filing amicus curiae briefs contended that DuPuy was not en-
titled to recover for damages to his right of access because the con-
struction of the viaduct was a reasonable exercise of the police
power. The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the
construction of the viaduct lacked the essential elements of an exer-
cise of the police power in that (1) DuPuy's property was not being
used to the detriment of the public interest; and (2) the property
was not being subjected to any type of regulation.4' Secondly, the
" New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134, 190 N.E. 562 (1934);
City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S.E. 674 (1926).
as 3 9 6 S.W.2d 103 (1965).
aCity of Waco v. DuPuy, 386 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
49 See note 27 supra and accompanying text. The court followed the reasoning of Pigeon-
hole Parking, holding that the plaintiff had no cause of action since there was no actual
physical taking and he was left with reasonable access.
4' 396 S.W.2d at 107.
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court turned to the rationale of Brazos River in saying "our refusal
to compartmentalize an exercise of sovereignty as either police power
or eminent domain for the resolution of problems arising under
article I, section 17, of the Constitution rests upon the manifest illu-
soriness of distinctions between them." Thus, regardless of what
power the city claimed that it had exercised, the property owner was
entitled to recover any special damages to his right of access since the
viaduct was constructed for the public use and not necessarily for
the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.
Therefore, the basic question before the supreme court was whether
DuPuy's access rights had been impaired to such an extent as to fall
within the meaning of "damages" as contemplated by article I, sec-
tion 17 of the constitution. The court first pointed out that the right
of access is a protected easement in Texas, but at the same time
stated:
This [protection] should not be extended to recognize a compensable
damaging where a property owner has reasonable access to his property
after construction of the public improvement. The benefits of private
ownership have been assured so long as there is reasonable access and an
action for compensation under the Constitution will not lie where such
is the case.'
Applying this rationale to the instant case, the court held that
DuPuy's right of access had been damaged as a matter of law under
article I, section 17, i.e., he had been deprived of reasonable ingress
and egress to his property by the construction of the public improve-
ment. Apparently, the court adopted the doctrine that a property
owner whose land is left abutting on a cul-de-sac after the construc-
tion of a public improvement suffers special damages not common
to the community at large." Even though DuPuy still had reason-
able access to his property in one direction by a way between the
4 Ibid.
43 Id. at 109. (Emphasis added.) It should be noted that the court considered the ques-
tion of damages as contemplated by article I, section 17 of the constitution to be one of
law and not one of fact. The court relied primarily on the decision in Housing Authority
of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940). In that case the
Texas Supreme Court held that the question of what is a public use under article I, section
17 of the constitution is a question of law for determination by the courts. The California
Supreme Court in the Ricciardi case, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944), adopted the
same rule. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held this same question
to be one of fact in Henderson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964).
"The court gave approval to the case of In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534,
205 N.W. 613 (1925), which held that an owner who is left abutting on a cul-de-sac
suffers special damages not common to the general public. It should be noted that the court
made no mention of the alley running from DuPuy's property to Franklin Avenue in con-
sidering whether he had reasonable access to his property. Apparently, an alley is not con-
sidered a reasonable means of access.
1966]
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supporting columns beneath the viaduct, the court stated that "it is
not enough that DuPuy can get to the system of public roads and
the traveling public can get to his building."'" It appears that here
the court considered the creation of a cul-de-sac in itself an unrea-
sonable interference with the right of access.
In a companion case, Archenhold Auto. Supply Co. v. City of
Waco," the court held that the property owner was not deprived of
reasonable access by the construction of the same viaduct on South
Seventeenth. However, the case differed from DuPuy in that Archen-
hold's property fronted not only on South Seventeenth but also on
Franklin Avenue, a major traffic artery in the city of Waco. Even
though the majority of the court stated that Archenhold's access
rights on South Seventeenth had incurred "special damages not suf-
fered in common with general public," ' it held that under the cir-
cumstances these damages were not compensable within the meaning
of the constitutional provision. The Texas Supreme Court applied
the New York rule" that "one of two public streets may be closed
without compensation to an abutting landowner if the remaining
street furnishes suitable means of access."" The majority expressed
the opinion that "the question of whether Archenhold retained rea-
sonable access should not be fragmented, i.e., be made to turn on
what happened on South Seventeenth Street apart from the unim-
peded frontage on Franklin Avenue."'" In short, Archenhold was
denied recovery for damages to its access rights on South Seventeenth
because it still had reasonable access to its property via Franklin
Avenue. Three justices dissented on the ground that Archenhold's
right of access on South Seventeenth had suffered special damages
for the public benefit, as acknowledged by the majority; and there-
fore, according to article I, section 17, he was entitled to compen-
sation. 1 The dissent seems to be the more sound and logical opinion
if one accepts the idea that the landowner has a right of reasonable
access to each separate street abutting his property. Conversely, the
soundness of the majority opinion depends on the acceptance of the
rationale that one's right of access must be considered in totality
rather than segmented in individual abutting streets. The latter view
4'396 S.W.2d at 110.
4396 S.W.2d 111 (1965).47 Id. at 114.
48 Egerer v. New York Cent. & H. R. R.R., 130 N.Y. 108, 29 N.E. 95 (1891); Fearing
v. Irwin, 55 N.Y. 486 (1874). The rule as applied here in an eminent domain case is ac-
tually the same as that announced in Pigeonhole Parking. See note 27 supra and accom-
panying text.





will obviously reduce the liability of governmental agencies in many
instances similar to that of Archenhold.
IV. CONCLUSION
If a Texas municipality interferes with one's right of access by a
reasonable exercise of the police power for the purpose of regulating
property being used to the public detriment, any resulting damage
will be held to be damnum absque injuria so long as the access rights
are not completely taken. On the other hand, the decisions of Brazos
River and DuPuy have made it equally clear that an abutting land-
owner can recover damages for an impairment of his access rights
for the public use regardless of the fact that the governmental agen-
cy claims to be exercising its police power. Whether the basis upon
which a public improvement is constructed is under the power of
eminent domain or the police power will be an important factor in
determining whether a landowner has suffered a compensable dam-
aging.
Apparently, the court in DuPuy has established the general rule
that one's right of access is not damaged within the purview of
article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution so long as he is left
with reasonable access to his property. Unlike the rule in the Bacich
case,5" it does not appear that DuPuy stands for the proposition that
an abutter who is left fronting on a cul-de-sac is automatically en-
titled to compensation. A landowner in such a situation could still
have reasonable access to his property via some other street. How-
ever, it does appear safe to say that when a landowner is left abutting
only on a cul-de-sac and has no reasonable means of access, he can
invoke article I, section 17. Under the rule of DuPuy, as illustrated
by Archenhold, even though a landowner's access rights may suffer
special damages not common to the general public, he may not re-
cover if he still has reasonable access to his property.' The validity
of this rule is based on the court's refusal to fragment the property
owner's right of access in separate streets. Under this rationale, an
owner whose property abutts on four streets could suffer special
damages to his right of access via three streets and yet not be entitled
to compensation because he still has reasonable access by way of the
fourth street. In effect, it appears that the court has carried over to
the public use cases the principle of Pigeonhole Parking,' i.e., that
52 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
"3 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
14 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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